25. Report by the Secretary General of Progress During the period
April 1952 to April 1957

24 APRIL 1957
Excerpts

(...) 

FOREWORD

The purpose of this Report is to indicate the principal developments
which have taken place in NATO since we moved to Paris in April 1952,
and, without entering too much into detail, to present an idea of the progress
that has been made in the principal NATO activities during the past five
years.

THE LISBON REORGANIZATION

1. The North Atlantic Council, at their Ninth Session held at Lisbon in
February, 1952, decided upon certain fundamental changes in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, namely:
(a) that the Council, while continuing to hold periodical Ministerial
Meetings, should, in future, function in permanent session through the
appointment of Permanent Representatives; and that it should assume
responsibility for the tasks hitherto performed by the Council Production
Board and the Financial and Economic Board, as well as those initiated by
the Temporary Council Committee;
(b) that a Secretary General should be appointed, and that a single integrated
and strengthened Staff/Secretariat should be established to assume
responsibility for the functions hitherto performed by the international
staffs and the various civilian agencies of the Treaty, and to provide the
Council with the necessary assistance in its broadening field of activities;
(c) that all North Atlantic Treaty Organization civilian activities should be
concentrated at a single Headquarters in or near Paris.

2. Pursuant to the above, the Council Deputies, the Financial and Economic
Board and the Defence Production Board ceased to exist on the 4th April,
1952 – the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

3. I assumed the office of Secretary General in London on that date; and
moved to Paris on the 16th April. I was joined there by the end of the month
by the Permanent Representatives of all member countries.
THE COUNCIL

4. The Council held its first meeting on the 28th April. Between then and the 31st March, 1957, they have met on no less than 505 occasions. During the same period there have been just over 7,000 meetings of Council Committees and Working Groups. This means that representatives at various levels of all member countries have met round the same table of no less than 7,500 occasions in five years. It can therefore be claimed that the Lisbon injunction that the Council should “function in permanent session” has been fulfilled in the letter as well as the spirit.

Ministerial Sessions

5. Since Lisbon, all Ministerial Sessions have been held in Paris; but in accordance with the decision taken last December that meetings of Foreign Ministers should occasionally be held in locations other than NATO Headquarters, the next Ministerial Meeting will commence on the 2nd May at Bonn.

6. As agreed at Lisbon, the Chairmanship of the Council has rotated annually. Since the move to Paris, it has been held by the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland and Italy.

7. In the Past the Chairman has frequently requested the Secretary General, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman, to take the Chair at Ministerial Meeting. It was decided last December that, in future, he should always do so. At the same time, a Minister will be appointed each year as President of the Council, in accordance with the practice of alphabetical rotation. The President will continue to have specially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and will, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He will also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial Sessions of the Council.

The Council of Permanent Representatives

8. As agreed at Lisbon, and reiterated in the Report of the Committee of the Three, the Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of effective decision. In other words, the authority of the Council, as such, is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there is no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

9. Nevertheless there is still a tendency in some quarters to regard the Council of Permanent Representatives as a sort of Second Eleven, which is

\[1\] Of these, 47 were Ministerial Sessions.
empowered to decide matters of relatively small importance, but, in the case of more important problems, to do no more than make preliminary studies with a view to their consideration and decision at Ministerial Sessions. In the interests of efficiency, it is important that the plenary authority of the Permanent Council should be generally recognised.

10. The meetings of the Council of Permanent Representatives have been of three different types. First, the normal sessions to which Permanent Representatives can bring four advisers or more, if business so requires. Secondly, there have been restricted sessions for the consideration of particularly confidential business. These are attended by not more than two advisers from each delegation, and the circulation of the records is restricted. Thirdly there have been 182 private sessions. These have been attended by Permanent Representatives alone, or occasionally by Permanent Representatives and one adviser. There is no formal Agenda: no official records are kept: and no commitments undertaken.

(...)

The International Staff

21. On arrival in Paris, my immediate task was to organize the International Staff/Secretariat on the general lines which had been agreed in principle between myself and the Council Deputies before they handed over to me.

(...)

26. I now turn to the question of the quality of the International Staff. In this connection it will be recalled that the Committee of Three expressly stated that “the effective functioning of NATO depended in large measure upon the efficiency, devotion and morale of its Secretariat”: and they recommended that governments should be prepared to give the International Staff “all necessary support both in finance and personnel.”

27. It is perhaps not sufficiently realised that the NATO International Staff suffers from certain inherent handicaps. In the first place, its members, coming as they do from 15 different countries have been trained on different doctrines and different systems. Secondly, in view of the fact that there are only two official languages, nine out of the fifteen partners have to operate in a language other than their mother tongue. It is one thing to be able to talk a foreign language fairly fluently: it is quite another to be able to draft reports in that language clearly and accurately. Thirdly, it is obviously desirable that all member countries should be proportionately represented on the staff. Consequently there can be no question of international competitive bidding for appointments. These have to be allotted not to the best man available in the Alliance, irrespective of nationality, but to the man selected by the government of the particular country which, in the interest of proportionate
representation, is asked to fill the appointment in question. Fourthly, the larger proportion of the more senior appointments of the staff are held by officials who are seconded by their respective governments for a tour of service with NATO, and who are replaced on the expiry of that term by other officials similarly seconded. Thus there is little or no prospect of substantial promotion within the International Staff.

28. Despite these inherent handicaps the International Staff have, in my opinion, acquired the team spirit in a remarkable degree, and have dedicated-themselves whole-heartedly to the cause of international solidarity. The Council, in general, and I myself in particular, owe them a deep debt of gratitude for their loyalty and cheerful devotion to duty in circumstances which have not always been easy.

NEW HEADQUARTERS FOR NATO

33. There has been a regrettable delay in the provision of a permanent Headquarters for NATO. As early as November, 1952, the French Government offered a site at Le Chesnay (Seine & Oise) which was provisionally accepted by the Council. After further consideration, however it became apparent that practically none of the delegations were prepared to have offices so far from their Embassies, on which they are dependant for communication with their Governments.

34. Government had considerable difficulties in finding a more central site, and it was not until April 1954 that they were in a position to offer the Council a plot of ground near the Porte Dauphine in Paris. This was gratefully accepted.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

39. Since the move to Paris, the higher military structure of NATO, namely the Military Committee the Standing Group and the Military Representatives Committee, has remained unchanged. There is, however, general agreement that a measure of reorganization is necessary in order to ensure inter alia that all NATO partners have their fair share of responsibility for the co-ordination and direction of military affairs. This problem has been considered both by the Council and the Military Committee, and is still being studied.

40. There have been a number of modifications in the Command organization during the period covered by this Report. In March, 1953, a new Command was established at Malta with the title of “Allied Forces
Mediterranean. In July of the same year a second new Command was established namely: “Allied Forces Central Europe” with Headquarters at Fontainebleau. Prior to this, the forces in Central Europe were under the direct Command of SACEUR. In addition the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in 1952 necessitated the establishment of “Land Forces South Eastern Europe Command” with Headquarters at Izmir, under Commander-in-Chief South.

41. The relations between the civil and military authorities at all levels have become increasingly harmonious each year. A particularly close relationship has grown up between the Council and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. From time to time he attends meetings of the Council in Paris, and the Council themselves have frequently visited SHAPE. This year for the first time the Council have been invited to attend CPX SEVEN, the highly secret command exercise which is held each year under the auspices of SHAPE.

42. The link between the Council in Paris and the Standing Group continues to be provided by the Standing Group Representative. This officer attends all the meetings of the Council, including private meetings, and is thus in a position to keep military authorities in Washington in the closest touch with the day-to-day thinking of the Council on all topics which have military implications. There would be obvious advantages in having the highest civil authorities and the highest military authorities of NATO in the same locality: but their are stronger arguments which have led to a continuation of the present arrangements.

THE ANNUAL REVIEW

43. Since 1952 there has been an Annual Review each year. No two Reviews have turned out exactly alike, and none has followed in all respects the procedures of the original TCC exercise. Nevertheless the basic character of the Review has changed little: this is in itself a tribute both to its value as an institution, and to its flexibility as an instrument.

44. The Annual Review “the main instrument for co-ordinating the defence effort of the Alliance” – traditionally provides a basis for the military planning of the Alliance by taking stock of NATO forces in being, and by establishing force goals for three years ahead. But it is well to recall, particularly at the present time, that this task is, and must continue to be, accomplished under the guiding light of “a careful appraisal of the economic risks involved in undertaking increased expenditure on defence against the military risks of not doing so.”

2 Until December, 1956, this Officer’s title was Standing Group Liaison Officer.
This is the key to the intricate procedures that have evolved: the detailed questionnaires sent to countries in the Spring; the thorough going military, and economic analysis of replies during the Summer; the multilateral examination of each country’s defence plans by the Annual Review Committee; the working up of recommendations both by the NATO military authorities and by the International Staff; the general assessment by the NATO military authorities of the defensive posture of the Alliance as a whole; and finally the decisions taken by the Council in Ministerial Session at the end of every year.

45. Each of the Annual Reviews which have taken place since the move to Paris has had its special problems. The 1952 Review was directed largely towards establishing in detail what needed to be done to meet the military programmes which had been accepted in Lisbon earlier in the year. In the 1953 Review the problem of the long-term maintenance of forces began to attract growing attention. In 1954 the Review had to take particular account of changes in planning due to the prospects of a German contribution and the use of nuclear weapons. In 1955 and 1956 long-term economic considerations, and the need for a strategic reappraisal, were the principal preoccupations.

47. The very diversity of the problems dealt with through the Annual Review is a measure of its achievement. But there are three general aspects of the work on the Review which merit special emphasis. First there is the habit, now firmly ingrained, of work done in common by all member governments, without reserve and in great detail, on matters which were formerly among the most jealously guarded of national secrets, even between Allies. Secondly, there has been a steady improvement in working relationships, formal and informal, between the NATO military authorities and the civilian International Staff. Mutual confidence and respect between civil and military staffs, though a basic condition of sound defence planning, is not easily or rapidly brought about in a new setting, with new men and new problems, even on the national plane. Nevertheless, thanks to the readiness of national delegations to accord increasing responsibility to the International Staff, collaboration between the NATO military authorities and the Staff has developed in the most encouraging fashion. In 1954 members of the staff had their first discussions with the Standing Group planners in Washington. In 1955 they were invited for the first time to accompany Commanders’ teams on visits to the NATO capitals. In 1956 they worked very closely with the planners on the preparation of the Review on the broader implications of the military recommendations to member countries,
and on the general report to the Council at the end of the year. In the 1957 Review there will be opportunities, for forging even closer links. There can be few more promising ways of ensuring that the overall military planning of the Alliance and the contributions to the common defence from member countries do not get out of step for purely technical reasons.

48. Lastly, the Annual Review, by setting out in a uniform and impartial way the state of each country’s forces, the problems relative to their upkeep, and the resources being devoted to defence, has always provided, and will, it is hoped, continue to provide, a realistic basis for the allocation of mutual aid. Experience has amply borne out the conclusions reached in the early days by the Financial and Economic Board, under the Council Deputies, that no simple and generally acceptable formula can be devised to measure each country’s capacity to undertake defence. The Annual Review without seeking to arrive at mathematical judgments in this respect, nevertheless gives a very fair picture of where the weaknesses lie, of where help between Allies is most needed, and of where it can most effectively be applied. In international defence, as in international trade, the only large economies are to be found in specialisation; i.e. in each country carrying out those tasks for which it is best fitted. Mutual aid, closely integrated with what each country plans to do on its own account, is the corollary to this; and it is to be hoped that, through the Annual Review, this aspect of the defence planning of the alliance will be further strengthened and developed.

PRODUCTION AND STANDARDISATION

49. The following paragraphs are intended to give an indication of the sort of work that has been and is being done under the above headings.

50. As far back as 1952, a review was carried out to enable a comparison to be made between the production capabilities of the European NATO countries on one hand, and their requirements for equipment on the other. This review revealed the need for intensifying production in several categories of equipment, and for creating, in certain cases, additional production facilities. Accordingly, a special working group set up by the Council co-operated with the Production and Logistics Division in preparing correlated production programmes for certain types of fighter aircraft, radio sets, small arms, artillery, escort vessels, mine-sweepers and many classes of ammunition. These programmes were to be financed partly by the countries concerned, and partly by the United States under the Mutual Assistance Programme.
51. Owing to the inability of certain European countries to allocate to these programmes all the funds originally contemplated, it was impossible to carry them out in full. Nevertheless, they played a significant part in the provision of equipment for the forces, and were largely instrumental in increasing production capacity in certain directions. The most noteworthy results were those obtained in the fields of electronics, aircraft and ammunition.

52. European versions of complex electronic devices, such as radars, were developed and put into production. The manufacture of United States type equipment was also started: this enabled spare parts for maintenance which would otherwise have had to be imported from the United States to be made in Europe.

53. The production of fighter aircraft was undertaken on a broader basis than would have been possible under purely national arrangement: e.g. the manufacture of British Hunter aircraft in Belgium and the Netherlands was organised in such a manner as to enable the best possible use to be made of the production facilities of both countries.

54. The combined capabilities of the European NATO countries for the production of munitions were increased five-fold, thanks in the first place to the sharing of the capital outlay for new plants between the European countries concerned and the United States, and secondly to very large offshore orders.

55. For some time now, the rapid advances made in manufacturing techniques and the introduction of new weapons have shifted the main effort from increasing the production capacity for conventional items or expanding production facilities for these items, to the development and supply of new equipment to meet the operational requirements of the Supreme Commanders.

56. The problem is many-sided and difficult, on account of the complex character of the equipment in question and the long lead-term involved, to say nothing of their much increased cost.

57. In the field of standardisation, the work of numerous groups of technical experts has resulted in the preparation of about forty standardisation agreements in respect of various components of motor vehicles, electronic equipment, anti-aircraft artillery and ammunition.
In most of NATO’s activities it is not easy to describe the progress achieved in precise terms. In the field of Infrastructure, however, progress since 1952 can be illustrated by figures which speak for themselves. They are, on the whole, not unimpressive.

In April 1952, there were less than 20 airfields available to NATO forces. Today there are 150 usable by all types of aircraft.

As regards communications, there were practically no land-lines, no submarine cables and no radio links, when NATO moved to Paris. There are now 5,500 miles of land-lines, 1,250 miles of submarine cables, and 1,940 miles of radio links.

In April 1952 there were no POL pipelines or storage facilities. There are now 2,840 miles of pipeline, and storage facilities for 30 million imperial gallons.

When NATO moved to Paris, infrastructure programmes amounting to £231 million had been approved and cost-sharing percentages agreed. During the period under review, programmes amounting to no less than £716 million have been approved. The problem of cost-sharing these programmes has been the subject of prolonged discussion on three separate occasions. On each occasion most countries honestly felt that they were being asked to contribute too large a proportion: but on each occasion unanimity was eventually reached. This speaks volumes for the spirit which prompts member governments to subordinate their national viewpoints to the needs of the solidarity of the alliance.

It should be added that contracts for common infrastructure works are open to competitive bidding from reputable firms in all the member countries. This system was introduced in 1953. It ensures that all members who contribute towards the cost of a project have a chance to benefit from the economic advantages which result from its construction.

It has sometimes been said that the construction of common infrastructure projects are too slow a business. As to this, it must be borne in mind first that a very large number of authorities are involved in almost every transaction the host country, the user country, the North Atlantic Council (working through the Infrastructure Committee, the Payments and Progress Committee and the International Staff) the Standing Group, the Supreme Commander, and the Subordinate Commanders:
secondly that the installations are generally highly technical and of considerable variety, and that they must in all respects be up to the standards required by the Military; thirdly that installations have to be set up in thirteen different countries; and finally, that, if NATO is to get full value for money, the most thorough check and cross-check and the most drastic screening and pruning are essential at all stages. Every effort has been made to simplify and speed up these processes, but even so the Infrastructure Committee and the Payments and Progress Infrastructure Committee are in almost continuous session.

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

65. The term civil emergency planning is used to denote the plans and preparations that must be made by governments in time of peace in order to ensure that the Home fronts will stand the strain of war.

66. There are some who say that the successful outcome of a nuclear war will depend upon the efficiency of the arrangements which have been made in time of peace to secure the home fronts more than on strictly military preparedness. There are others who argue that no civil defence can be effective against nuclear attack and, therefore, that all civil emergency planning is a waste of time and money. The truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. But it cannot be denied that it is the bounden duty of every Government to do its utmost to make plans which would ensure that, in the event of the unspeakable catastrophe of a thermo-nuclear war, the civil population and civilian activities would be efficiently controlled and directed.

67. When NATO moved to Paris in 1952, only two aspects of civil emergency planning were already being studied. There was a planning Board for Ocean Shipping, which was charged with the responsibility of preparing plans for the mobilisation and control of merchant shipping in time of war; and there was a Petroleum Planning Committee which was charged with the responsibility of assessing the wartime military and civilian petroleum requirements and of preparing plans to ensure that available supplies would be distributed in time of war to the best advantage of the Alliance as a whole.

68. In the course of my first interview after my arrival in Paris with General-Eisenhower (then SACEUR), he expressed grave anxiety about the lack of NATO preparedness for war in the civilian field, particularly in the matter of civil defence and of refugees and evacuees. I reported this to the Council who addressed themselves to these problems at the first opportunity.

69. Before the end of 1952, nine new planning committees had been set up, namely: The Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport, The Civil Defence Committee, The Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, The
Food and Agriculture Planning Committee, The Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee, The Coal and Steel Planning Committee and an Expert Working group on Manpower.

70. Subsequently the field of Emergency Planning was further extended, and it became apparent that with so many different Boards and Committees working on different aspects of the same problem, there was a serious risk of confusion and overlapping unless arrangements were made to give them uniform guidance, co-ordinate their work, and review their progress.

71. Accordingly, in November 1955, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee was set up by the Council to undertake this work. The Chairman is the Secretary General of NATO, and the members are, as a rule, those officials who are responsible for civil emergency planning in their own countries. This Committee has already proved its value.

73. To sum up, it may be said that NATO civil emergency planning has now been established on a fairly satisfactory footing. The necessary machinery is in existence: the NATO goals and objectives, as well as the priorities governing them, have been agreed upon: and national and international plans and progress are to be reviewed at least once a year. It may well be that in the future there will be an Annual Review of Civil Emergency Planning on the same lines as the military Annual Review. At the same time it must be admitted that, although some nations have made satisfactory plans and preparations, the same cannot be said of all of them. This is a matter which the Council have constantly brought to the attention of Governments.

THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

74. It is fair to say that from the moment that NATO came to Paris, the Council have not lost sight of the importance of developing co-operation between the member countries in the field of Article 2 of the Treaty, and it may be claimed that some progress has been achieved in this field. Nevertheless, a great deal remain to be done; and it was with this in view that the Council, at the Ministerial Session of May, 1956, set up a Committee of Three Foreign Ministers (Dr. G. Martino, Italy; Mr. H Lange, Norway; and Mr. L.B. Pearson, Canada) “to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.”

75. This Committee met in Paris in June, and prepared a questionnaire which was sent to all NATO member governments seeking their views on a number of specific aspects of the problems under study.
On the basis of the replies to this questionnaire, the Committee during the month of September held consultations with representatives (in most instances the Foreign Minister) of each country individually. The Committee also met with the Secretary General, and with representatives of parliamentary associations, and voluntary organizations connected with NATO.

76. The Report was submitted to the Council in November 1956. At the Ministerial meeting in December, 1956, the Council approved its recommendations and authorised its publication. Some of the more important recommendations made by the Committee, and the action that has been taken, or is contemplated thereon, are summarised under their appropriate headings later in this Report.

**POLITICAL CO-OPERATION**

77. Ever since their arrival in Paris, the Council in permanent session have given increasing attention to political consultation, and it is significant that the number of Private Meetings, which are generally devoted to political matters, has steadily increased each year. In 1952, there were 17 such meetings; in 1953, 23; in 1954, 35; in 1955, 43; and in 1956, 66. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the practice of consultation in the Council has not as yet developed sufficiently to meet the demands of political changes and world trends.

78. It was with this in mind that the Committee of Three devoted a significant part of their Report to this subject, and they recommended, inter alia, that Foreign Ministers, at each spring Meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance. This will be done at Bonn next month.

79. The Committee also recommended that, with a view to preparing for the above discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report analysing the major political problems of the Alliance, reviewing the extent to which Member Governments had consulted on such problems, and indicating the problems and possible developments which might require future consultation. The Council decided that there was not sufficient time for the Secretary General to prepare a report of this kind for the next meeting.

80. Another important recommendation of the Committee of Three was that a Committee of Political Advisers should be set up under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff, the members being provided by each Delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. This Committee was duly established in January, 1957, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs;
and it has been in practically continuous session ever since. The Committee has been much assisted in its studies by calling on the aid of specialists from Member Governments. Three such groups of experts have recently co-operated with them in producing comprehensive political reports on problems of special concern to the Alliance.

**DISPUTES BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES**

81. The Committee of Three drew attention to the crucial importance of avoiding serious disputes between member countries, and of setting them quickly and satisfactorily if they were to occur. With this in view, they recommended, inter alia, that the Secretary General should, in the event of any such dispute, be empowered to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties concerned, and, with their consent, to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.

82. Accordingly, I deemed it my duty last March to offer my good offices to the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for the settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. The Governments of Turkey and the United Kingdom accepted my proposal in principle but the Government of Greece have so far felt unable to do so.

**ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION**

83. The Committee of Three recommended the setting up of a Committee of Economic Advisers. This Committee has been established under the Chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance. It will discuss any economic issues of special interest to the Alliance, particularly those which have political or defence implications, or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole without, however, duplicating the work which is being carried out in other more specialized international organisations.

**CO-OPERATION IN THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FIELDS**

84. The Council have not been unmindful of their responsibility for promoting co-operation between the member countries in the social and cultural fields. But it must be admitted that the results so far achieved have been relatively modest.

(...)


INFORMATION

91. In practically every Progress Report that I have submitted the last five years, I have invited attention to the desirability -indeed the necessity of enlightening public opinion in all member countries about the purpose and achievements of the North Atlantic Alliance. While it is clear that the Council, and the International Staff have an important rôle to play in this matter, it is equally clear that the primary responsibility rests with individual governments.

92. The above views were endorsed by the “Committee of Three”, who put forward a number of helpful recommendations, as to the specific measures which should be taken to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division, and national Information Services; and they emphasised that “the former must be given the necessary resources by governments as well as their support”.

93. It must be frankly admitted that there is still widespread ignorance about NATO in all the member countries, even among men, and women who are generally speaking well informed. On the other hand it can be claimed that substantial headway has been made in this field during the past five years. Some idea of the rate of expansion of information activities may be gauged from the fact that in 1952 the operational budget was eight million French francs. Reflecting, I trust both a growing conviction of the part of member countries that there was an important job to be done and an increased confidence in the ability of the International Staff to make a useful contribution to the task, the budget has increased each year, and in 1957 reached a total of 93.6 million French francs. It is, however, to be noted that whereas the staff authorized for the Information Division numbered 38 in 1952, it still stands at that figure. An increase is urgently required if we are to cope with our ever-growing activities. These are summarised in the paragraphs that follow.

(...)

NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS

101. In 1953, the Council agreed to suggest that member governments should encourage the setting up of groups Parliamentarians specially interested in NATO. It was thought that these groups might develop their own contact with each other, and might perhaps arrange combined meetings, say at NATO Headquarters, to discuss matters of common interest.
102. During 1954, Parliamentary groups from Denmark, Norway, France and the United Kingdom visited the Palais de Chaillot and were briefed by the International Staff. In the following year Parliamentary groups from Belgium and Canada did likewise.

103. In July 1955 the first Conference of groups of Parliamentarians from all NATO countries was held at the Palais de Chaillot under the Chairmanship of Senator Robertson of Canada. Some 200 Members of Parliament from 14 NATO countries attended. All necessary technical facilities were provided by the International Staff.

104. The final resolutions of the Conference were:
   1. that the Speakers of Parliaments concerned should be invited to send delegates to similar assemblies each year;
   2. that the governments of the countries represented should facilitate, through the NATO Council, further meetings; and
   3. that a Continuing Committee should be set up.

105. The Continuing Committee mentioned in (iii) above was duly set up and had its first meeting in London in September 1955 to discuss organizational questions.

106. A second Conference of Parliamentarians was held in November 1956 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Wayne L. Hays of the United States, Member of the House of Representatives. On this occasion all member countries were represented. The Secretary General, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, addressed the Conference, and senior civil and military officers attended several of the meetings. All possible technical facilities were again provided by the International Staff. The discussions were frank and constructive and extended to a number of highly controversial questions.

107. The Committee of Three, in their Report to the Council, emphasised the importance of maintaining a close relationship between Parliamentarians and NATO. It is hoped that this will be ensured by the machinery and procedures which are described in the foregoing paragraphs.

3Owing to pressure of parliamentary business, Italy could not be represented.
108. Voluntary organizations in support of NATO have been set up in 12 member countries, namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. (See Annex F).

109. In February 1955, an international body entitled “Atlantic Treaty Association” was set up to co-ordinate the activities of all these national organizations. The Association has (1) an Assembly, (2) a Council, and (3) a Secretariat. (...