CHAPTER 6

NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The title "a European Security and Defence Identity" is of recent origin in official NATO jargon. Not before June 1992 did it show in communiqué's of the North Atlantic Council. The title may be new, the issue itself is as old as the North Atlantic Alliance. France and Britain originally wanted American adhesion to their alliance of five, created by the Treaty of Brussels of 17 March 1948 rather than a new Atlantic Alliance with many member states and under American leadership. Still the latter is exactly what has been happening to NATO ever since. One outcome of this perennial U.S.-West European friction is an utterly complex and forever unfinished relationship between NATO and the institutions of European unification. Throughout NATO's sixty years existence, the relationship is subject to at least three interrelated differences. The first one is conceptual: Is security to be organised in an intergovernmental Alliance under U.S. leadership or as the primary task of a federal union? The second one is institutional: Is cooperation to be intergovernmental and multilateral or intra-European and inter-Atlantic (reaching a common European Union position before talking with the other NATO members)? The third difference is about military capabilities: how to share the burden and allocate powers? It is the old problem of the contrast between the European claim for a security role and the very low levels of capability and interoperability of European armed forces. The net result of these differences is an utterly complex and never settled relationship between NATO and the European Union.

EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty of Washington, the issue arose in connection with the question of West German participation and the French plan for a European Army. Washington, as we saw already in Chapter 2 of this Part II, wanted immediate West German participation in the defence of the Alliance; Paris was against the rebuilding of German national armed forces. Rene Pleven came up with a solution along the lines of the Schuman Plan of 1950 for the Coal and Steel Industries. As he told the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950:

> "It proposes the creation, for our common defence, of a European army tied to political institutions of a united Europe.
> This suggestion is directly inspired by the recommendations adopted on August 11, 1950 by the assembly of the Council of Europe, demanding the immediate creation of a unified European army destined to cooperate with the American and Canadian Forces in the defence of peace.
> The setting up of a European army cannot result from a mere grouping together of national military units, which would in reality only mask a coalition of the old sort. For tasks which are inevitably common ones, only common institutions will do. The army of a united Europe, composed of men coming from different European countries, must, so far as is possible, achieve a complete fusion of the human and material elements which make it up under a single European political and military authority.
> A Minister of Defence would be appointed by the participating governments and would be responsible, under conditions to be determined, to those appointing him and to a European Assembly. That assembly might be the Assembly in Strasbourg, or an offshoot thereof, or an assembly composed of specially elected delegates. His powers with respect to the European army would be those of a national minister of defence with respect to the national forces of his own country. He would, in particular, be responsible for implementing such general directives as he might receive from a council composed of ministers of the participating countries. He would serve as the normal channel between the

> European Community and outside countries or international organs for everything relating to the carrying out of his task.
> The contingents furnished by the participating states would be incorporated in the European army at the level of the smallest possible unit."[1]

U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, did not like the French plan, he found it "hopeless." As he wrote

> "In essence it [the Pleven Plan] proposed that, *in addition to the elements of their national forces* that European Allies would pledge to the defence of Europe under the command of a Supreme Commander in time of war (but which would remain under national control in peacetime), *a special European force would be created under a European minister of Defence and its own command and staff structure*, in turn under the Supreme Commander."

What he apparently disliked in the Plan was a European Force with its own command and staff structure in addition to national forces under the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. He soon changed his mind, as he wrote:

> "During the summer of 1951 I had come to the conclusion that the best way to an adequate German contribution to defence lay in strong support of the French proposal for a European Defence Community."[2]

A European Defence Community: promising but abortive

As resistance against the Plan grew in France, the U.S. increasingly came out in support of it; even to the point of announcing "an agonizing reappraisal" of U.S. policy (John Foster Dulles), if

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1 An abbreviated version of the Pleven Plan can be found in document II.6.1.

2 *The Struggle for a Free Europe,* Norton & Company 1971, p.142 and 160 (emphasis added).

the French National Assembly would reject the European Defence Community Treaty.

As we know, the Treaty was rejected. The chance to organise Europe's security and defence identity in conformity with the ideals of the European federalists and in a way that would satisfy the Americans would not come back before the end of the twentieth century.

The French Plan as elaborated by the Conference (of the six member states of the ECSC) for the organisation of a European Defence Community, nevertheless, offered the most acceptable solution to date. On 19 February 1952, the Conference submitted a highly interesting report to the North Atlantic Council. In its first chapter on Objectives and General Principles of the Treaty to institute a European Defence Community, the Report stated (e.g.):

> "That the establishment of a Defence Community of the free peoples of Europe *represents an essential step towards achieving a united Europe*;
> The European Forces will make use of a common supply system, and *a common armament programme* will be prepared;
> In all spheres the European Defence Community will proceed in close cooperation with the nations of the free world, in particular with those of the Atlantic Community;
> In wartime, the Atlantic Supreme Command will exercise the operational command of the forces"[3] (emphasis added).

Had the Treaty entered into force in accordance with the plans outlined in the report, it might have provided the best possible solution for a European Security and Defence Identity within the Atlantic Alliance. It might have paved the way for a European Political Community (then under discussion); and it might have

[3] Text of the Treaty can be consulted in document II.6.2.

contributed to a more equal partnership between the United States and a united Europe.

A Stop-gap solution: WEU

Following the rejection of the EDC Treaty, Britain took the initiative in devising a more traditional, intergovernmental solution for West German participation in the defence of the West. The admission of Germany to NATO through a revision of the 1948 Pact of Brussels – henceforward to be called the Western European Union – satisfied the Americans. In his Statement of 10 March 1955 the U.S. President reaffirmed America's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, as "there is established on the continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the Paris Agreements will provide."[4]

The British device clearly was a stop-gap solution invented by a government which at the time refused to participate in the European unification process. WEU was an intergovernmental organisation with no links to the emerging European community. For a long time, defence and security would remain outside the European integration process.

Divisive approach

Shortly after Charles de Gaulle came to power in France, the issue of a European security and defence identity was raised again. His approach to the issue was part of the twofold crisis he provoked during his presidency: the Alliance crisis (discussed in Part II, chapter 2 above) and the European Community crisis, resulting from his "no" to British entry. Charles de Gaulle was a declared opponent of (what he liked to call) American hegemony, and a supranational Europe. What he wanted to achieve in

[4] See document II.6.4. The Paris Agreements on WEU and German admission to NATO can be found in documents II.2.5 and II.5.3.

security and defence was a European identity opposed to the United States without unity of purpose and organisation among the Europeans. He wanted more independence for Europe from the United States but without foregoing continuing American commitment to the defence of Europe. He wanted the other European states and Germany in particular to accept French leadership but offered them no more than intergovernmental consultation to that end.

Within weeks after his unilateral rejection of British membership to the European Communities, he concluded on 22 January 1963 a bilateral cooperation treaty with Germany.[5]

Ever since, the search for a European identity in security and defence would have the unenviable task of squaring the circle of achieving a European identity without unity and of acquiring more independence from the United States without losing their full commitment to European security. The programme for defence cooperation in the French-German Treaty remained a dead letter until 1982. The Germans cherished the special relationship with France with respect to European Community affairs, but refused to give up their special relationship with the United States on security and defence in favour of a special relationship with France.

WEU revived

In 1982 French President Mitterrand could obtain Chancellor Kohl's agreement for reviving WEU and the defence paragraph in the French-German Treaty, but for rather different reasons. As long as West Germany was a reliable ally in NATO's forward defence strategy, France could afford to pursue its ideas for more independence from the United States and for a European identity against the United States. In 1982, Mitterrand feared that German reliability could be eroded by domestic opposition in Germany against the implementation of the Double-Track deci-

5 Text of the Treaty can be found in document II.6.3.

sion of 1979. Reviving WEU and French-German defence cooperation – in his view – could bolster German resolve and so a new chapter was opened in the long history towards achieving a European Security and Defence identity. For the first time West Germany, where CDU Chancellor Kohl had come to power, was prepared to go along with the French effort.

The ensuing history on the issue is well described in the Report by Wim van Eekelen to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.[6]

Still, little progress was made until the end of Europe's division in 1989. Whereas the Germans and the other European Community members were willing to go along with the French ideas to revive WEU, the French were unwilling to draw the logical conclusions from their own new approach. Rather than returning to NATO and thus strengthening the European "pillar" within NATO, the French still cherished the idea of more independence from the United States. In 1987 the WEU Ministerial Council agreed on a Platform on European Security Interests. The Platform, however, was far from being the European Security Charter, French Prime Minister Chirac (at the time) had proposed. It accepted the idea that the construction of an integrated Europe would remain incomplete as long as it did not include security and defence, but also affirmed that such inclusion should strengthen the transatlantic partnership and the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole.[7]

A common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

With the end of Europe's division, the search for a European Security and Defence identity moved into another new phase. On the proposal of France and Germany, a common foreign and security policy was included in the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht and the Treaty opened the possibility of

6 EU, WEU and NATO: Towards a European Security and Defence Identity, November 1999 by Wim van Eekelen. Reproduced as document II.6.5.

7 Text in document II.6.6.

the WEU elaborating and implementing decisions having defence implications.

The WEU Council of Ministers responded to this development with three specific agreements: the Presidency's conclusions of 22 February 1991 on WEU's role and place in the new European security architecture; the Declaration of Maastricht, 10 December 1991, on The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance; and its Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992.

In the two documents of 1991, the emphasis still was – as in the past – on defence. WEU presented itself "as a bridge between the process of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance." It considered itself to be the identifiable defence component for a European Union taking on a greater degree of responsibility for its own defence, as well as the best link to the Atlantic Alliance, "as the only European organisation based on a mutual defence commitment" (article V of the WEU Treaty).

The Petersberg Declaration signified a marked change of emphasis from defence to new missions. As its paragraph II.4 stated: "Apart from contributing to the common defence (...) military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

Such missions, clearly, were non-article V missions and "participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member States in accordance with national constitutions." This Declaration opened the way to an operational role for WEU by the willingness of member states to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. The new missions for which WEU claimed a role, were not the specific responsibility of WEU. As a consequence, the Declaration – in Part III – opened the possibility for other member states of the

European Union either to accede to WEU or to become observers. At the same time it opened the possibility for other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance to become associate members of WEU.[8]

WEU rapidly moved to a complex network of 28 nations divided in four different categories, much like NATO itself with its North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace Programmes; thus adding to the proliferation of political consultation arrangements already discussed above (Chapter 4 in Part II).

A common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the burial of WEU

The revised Treaty on European Union signed in Amsterdam opened the possibility (in article 17 in the consolidated version, article J.7 in the original version) of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. Another Declaration adopted by the WEU Council is attached to the Final Act concluded with the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 17 (J.7) went no further than providing for closer institutional relations with the WEU "with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the Council so decide – that is without the necessity of having a new IGC for that purpose. Still, in that case, the Council shall recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." In a Protocol, it was agreed only that the European Union shall draw up, together with the WEU, arrangements for enhanced cooperation with them, within a year from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Britain in particular was not yet ready at the time to agree to such integration.[9]

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8 The set of WEU Documents referred to can be found in document II.6.7.

9 Text of the Declaration in document II.6.8

At Cologne in June 1999, the European Council, however, stated it to be its aim to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000, "including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks."

The new acronym ESDP was born at the Cologne European Council. The drive for an accelerated implementation of an ESDP is to be seen as a response to two developments. The first one was the Defence agreement at the French-British Summit of 4 December 1998 reached at St. Malo by which the British government pledged support for a common defence policy with its own autonomous capacity for action and within the institutional framework of the European Union.[10] The second one was the Operation "Allied Force" over Kosovo, where the Europeans found out that only the United States had the political resolve and the military capability to conduct such an operation. At Cologne, as a consequence, the European Council decided to give priority to implementing article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. At their next summit in Helsinki, the Council adopted the two Presidency progress reports with respect to the creation of the military capabilities of the Union to carry out the Petersberg tasks, and the establishment of new permanent political and military structures within the Council for these tasks. According to the Report, member states also set themselves "the headline goal" to cooperate towards the ability for rapid deployment of forces capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks (forces up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).[11]

Although not explicitly stated, the Helsinki conclusions amount to an agreement to terminate WEU as a separate organisation (integration into EU). Annex IV only states in this respect that "the development of the common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the

[10] Text of this important UK-French Defence Agreement can be found in document II.6.9.

[11] For excerpts of the Presidential conclusions of the European Council meetings in 1999 and 2000 consult document II.6.10.

commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which will be preserved for the Member States party to these Treaties." In other words: the strengthened EDSP is a policy to be carried out under the aegis of the European Council. The integration of the WEU into the Union concerns only "those functions" and can thus be implemented without the adoption of such a decision by member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements (compare article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam). Following the British change of mind, EU members finally gave in to a long-standing French desire "to make the European Council the supreme guiding and decision-making body in the field of security and defence" in the words of President Chirac.

After Helsinki and due to basic French-German-British agreement, the European Council in Nice agreed on the principal issues mentioned in the conclusions of the European Council in Feira.

In Nice, the European Council agreed on the gradual establishment of permanent political and military bodies, including the replacement of article 25 of the Treaty of Amsterdam by a new article 25. It replaced the political committee by a Political and Security Committee entrusted with the task to exercise political and strategic direction of crisis management operations under the responsibility of the Council.

The European Council also agreed to include the appropriate functions of the WEU in the European Union. Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam was replaced by a new article 25 in which all references to WEU except one, were removed. WEU would only retain residual functions and structures necessary for upholding the collective defence guarantee contained in Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty (for its ten full members) and the function of cooperation in the armaments field.[12]

[12] For those interested in these complex and unclear arrangements, consult documents II.6.10-12.

The French Presidency could also report on progress made towards the headline goal of developing the European capabilities needed to carry out the full range of tasks referred to in Article 17 (the Petersberg tasks). On this crucial issue, however, the EU is faced with a glaring gap between political resolve and available resources – shortage in manpower and equipment, declining defence budgets and technology gaps. A meeting scheduled during the Swedish Presidency to find solutions by which the headline goal could be met, has been postponed until the autumn of 2001. The force will not be in place in 2003, nor will it be in 2009.

Consultation and Cooperation Arrangements between NATO and EU

At the time of the Nice Summit no agreement had been reached on permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation between NATO and EU on the basis of the EU proposals.[13] Due to Turkish opposition no agreement could be reached at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. In January 2001 new arrangements were agreed by NATO and the EU for permanent consultation between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee (three meetings per semester at ambassadorial level, two meetings per year at Foreign Ministers level).

As it stands following the European Council session at Nice in December 2000, the ESDP is not as yet a common policy nor does it include defence. ESDP is a strictly intergovernmental arrangement under the (questionable) supreme political guidance of the European Council. For the time being, it is restricted to crisis management, like the new non-Article 5 missions of NATO, but without clear leadership or the required military capabilities.

[13] Proposals can be found in document II.6.13.

The American reactions to the search for a European security and defence identity since 1990 followed much the same pattern as Dean Acheson's reactions to the Pleven Plan in 1950.

The initial reaction in 1990 was negative.[14] The Clinton Administration took a more positive attitude as reflected in the Brussels Declaration issued in January 1994 by the NATO Summit, the North Atlantic Council communiqué of June 1996 at Berlin and the Washington Summit in 1999.[15]

The change of British policy leading to agreement on a strengthened EDSP came as an unpleasant surprise to Washington. The Americans have voiced their misgivings about ESDP since the St. Malo Summit of 1998. Much like in the past, they see mainly three reasons for concern and disagreement: (1) the European unwillingness to redress the imbalance between the Europeans and the Americans in military equipment; (2) the European desire to agree first among themselves and consult the Americans later, where the U.S. wants any discussion about the handling of crises to start inside the Alliance; and (3) the unresolved issues surrounding European decision-making in crises given the fact that some EU members are not in NATO and some NATO members are not in the EU.[16] The first and third reason for concern are still present, the latter primarily due to Turkey's troubled relationship with the European Union.

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14 See: Michael Brenner, *Terms of Engagement. The United States and the European Security Identity*, Praeger, 1998.

15 Excerpts are to be found in document II.6.14.

16 28 NATO member countries: *Albania*, Belgium, Bulgaria, *Canada, Croatia*, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, *Iceland,* Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, *Norway*, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, *Turkey,* United Kingdom*, United States*.*
27 EU member countries: *Austria*, Belgium, Bulgaria, *Cyprus*, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, *Finland*, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, *Ireland*, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, *Malta*, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, *Sweden*, the United Kingdom.**
*) In Italics: no EU member state (7). 21 double memberships.
**) In Italics: no NATO member state (6).

The Washington Summit, however, did initiate a more acceptable relationship as agreed in paragraphs 9 and 10:

> "9. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and – following the St. Malo Declaration – in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the twenty-first century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:
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> a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
> b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;
> c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
> d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.
> e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.

10. On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

a. Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
d. The further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations."

It took another three years before agreement was reached between EU and NATO through which the EU could use Alliance military assets if required. In December 2002, agreement was reached on the establishment of a so called strategic partnership between NATO and the EU and to this end:

"The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002;
NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002;

> Both organisations have recognised the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness."[17]

In 17 March 2003 the "Berlin Plus Arrangements" were agreed upon in an exchange of letters between the Secretary General of NATO and the High Representative for Foreign Policy of the European Union. The half-secret Arrangements consist of the following seven parts:

(1) NATO-EU Security Agreement covering the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules;
(2) Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO);
(3) Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO; such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;
(4) Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities;
(5) Terms of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO;
(6) EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
(7) Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations.

In order to enhance the EU's military planning capabilities, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany reached a compromise in December 2003 under the "European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations." This document constituted the basis of:

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[17] EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP of 16 December 2002 in document II.6.15.

(1) the establishment (in 2005) of a British-proposed EU permanent planning cell at NATO headquarters (SHAPE) aimed at helping coordinate "Berlin Plus" missions, or those EU missions conducted using NATO assets;

(2) the inclusion in the existing EU Military Staff of a small operational civil-military planning cell whose task is to carry out early warning, situation assessment and civil-military strategic planning rather than purely military missions.
The EU Council may draw on the expertise of the cell in circumstances where NATO as a whole is not engaged, when a joint civil-military response is required and no national HQ can be identified or if NATO or national planners are not available;[18]

(3) NATO's permanent liaison arrangements with the EU Military Staff to help ensure transparency and close coordination between NATO and the EU.[19]

In 2003 ESDP finally moved from plans to policy with its first (NATO supported) operation in Macedonia and its autonomous operation in the Republic of Congo. As is shown in "NATO-EU Strategic Partnership," cooperation in the field between NATO and the EU, has been of three kinds: (1) In Macedonia and Bosnia, EU has taken over from NATO; (2) In Kosovo EU's EULEX functions alongside NATO's KFOR; and (3) in some other regions they operate in a somewhat competitive mode.

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[18] This planning/operational cell represents the final result of the debates on the possible creation of the EU separate military headquarters, planning staff, and armaments agency suggested by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at the Summit of Four in April 2003. Although not under EU auspices, this four-power meeting recalled the French persistent preference for a more autonomous European defence identity. The proposal was fought tooth-and-nail by Britain who regarded it as a frivolous waste of money and a serious threat for NATO.

[19] For the Berlin Plus Arrangements and the British-French-German compromise see document II.6.16.

Cooperation in the field

The Balkans

In July 2003, the European Union and NATO published a "Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans." Jointly drafted, it outlines core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organizations share to bring stability to the region.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first "Berlin Plus" operation in which NATO assets were made available to the European Union.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 December 2004. The EU force (EUFOR) operates under the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance's assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. There is also an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) located at SHAPE.

Kosovo

NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999. The European Union has contributed civil assets to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for years and agreed to take over the police component of the UN Mission. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which deployed in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. EULEX works closely with KFOR in the field. NATO and EU experts worked in the same team to support the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Martti Ahtisaari, in negotiations on the future status of the province of Kosovo.

COOPERATION IN OTHER REGIONS

Afghanistan

NATO and the European Union are playing key roles in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, within the international community's broader efforts to implement a comprehensive approach in their efforts to assist the country. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force helps create a stable and secure environment in which the Afghan government as well as other international actors can build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country. NATO welcomed the EU's launch of an ESDP Rule of Law mission (EUPOL) in June 2007. The European Union has also initiated a programme for justice reform and is helping to fund civilian projects in NATO-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are led by an EU member country.

Darfur

Both NATO and the EU supported the African Union's mission in Darfur, Sudan, in particular with regard to airlift rotations.

Piracy

Since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces are deployed side by side, with other actors, off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions.[20]

As Asle Toje explains in an outstanding paper for the EU Institute for Security Studies, EU-NATO interaction and cooperation is still awkward.[21] The Turkey-Cyprus problem is one bottleneck but not the only one. There are also differences in bureaucratic culture, serious capability gaps between the United States and the European Allies and above all conceptual differences.

NATO AND EU: CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES

Ever since the divisive ideas of former French President Charles de Gaulle entered the search for a European security and defence identity, two fundamental problems – solved in the plans for a European Defence Community – defied a solution. The first one was the internal organisation of European defence. The second one was the relation between a common European defence policy and Allied defence policy in NATO under U.S. leadership.

The much advocated European "pillar" of NATO could become a pillar only, if the Europeans could agree on unified po-

20 From document II.6.17.

21 Asle Toje, *The EU, NATO and European Defence – A Slow Train Coming*, Occasional Paper, December 2008, 74, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

litical control over their joint military forces. Only such unified control could assure e.g. a common armaments policy and the development of military capabilities comparable to those of the United States. Intergovernmental cooperation and consultation arrangements – as has been amply demonstrated since the 1950's – cannot build such a pillar. Identity without unity is bound to remain a divisive concept both inside the European Union and in relation to the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as long as collective self-defence was the primary function, a distinct European identity remained an unfulfilled dream; commitment to NATO prevailed.

The renewed search for a European identity, as a consequence, arose only after 1989, when the Allies decided to add the new mission of non-article 5 crisis operations to the original self-defence function. Some European governments, the French in particular, saw new room for developing a distinct role for themselves in crisis-management outside the North Atlantic area. Ever since de Gaulle, the French have been on record for their compulsion to liberate themselves from dependence on the United States. The German and British governments this time appear to have joined for different reasons. Acting within the EU framework may better help German governments to overcome popular reluctance to commit German forces outside German territory. In the case of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, French-British defence cooperation might enhance Britain's European role even without becoming part of the Euro-zone.

The European Union members could agree on a more important role for themselves to act autonomously in crisis management, but not in self-defence.

Still, Operation Allied Force has made clear that major crisis management operations even in small territories like Kosovo, cannot be mounted without unified political control and the necessary and complex military capabilities that can be available only under unified political control. A solid basis for such control and such capabilities has been found only in the need for self-defence. It is unlikely to be laid in the future in any other way. A European Union in which several members are not com-

mitted to mutual assistance (article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) lacks such solid basis. The ESDP as it is developing since the European Council meetings at Cologne and Helsinki, is unlikely to achieve its stated objectives but could well erode Allied cohesion. The search for a European security and defence identity along the lines of a ESDP is bound to be a long-term process at best.

The concept, in addition, has major flaws in the context of the new post-1989 European security environment.

Concept and the reality of the 1990's

For the first time since their creation NATO and the European Union were confronted with the need to use force in Europe to deal with the crises of Yugoslavia. Confident about the progress reached through the negotiations towards the Treaty of Maastricht, the Europeans claimed the principal role in crisis-management for themselves with the exclusion of the United States. It is too well known that crisis-management by the European Union since Maastricht has been a failure. Both in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and in Kosovo (1999), only the United States and NATO could ensure the necessary political guidance and provide the military means to direct the operations. As Brenner wrote:

> "The cumulative record of EU failure and NATO's recovery sharpened the issue of whether an ESDI built within NATO on the CJTF principle was satisfactory. For the European Allies, the record could be read two ways: as making a compelling case for them to take more drastic measures to augment their military resources and to cement their union, or as providing telling evidence that the quest for an autonomous ESDI was futile. Few drew the first conclusion."[22]

[22] *Op.cit.*, p.35.

After Kosovo, the European Council did draw the first conclusion, but the new political and military bodies established within the Council "to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations" are not likely to be up to these tasks. The Petersberg missions referred to give no more than a broad list of crisis management missions, military units of EU member states "could be employed for"; they fall far short of the necessary strategic direction for autonomously carrying out such operations. The European Union in its present stage of development is ill-suited for such tasks and the European Council is the least appropriate body to give the necessary political leadership in an acute crisis requiring the rapid deployment of substantial military forces. It is at best uncertain whether the European Council can do better once the Treaty of Lisbon may have entered into force.

Security architecture and security functions for ESDI

The search for an ESDI since 1990 has been a long and slow-moving effort to elaborate a European security architecture for an autonomous role in a changing European security environment. Even after St. Malo and Kosovo, "opinions vary widely among West European capitals as to what security functions an ESDI could or should serve." The focus on one organisation, the European Union, to "play its full role on the international stage" almost completely ignores the multiplicity of security threats to be faced and the variety of functions to be performed. As Brenner, again, writes:

> "A curious feature of the elaborate exercises in security architecture has been the distance between those rarefied processes and the practical requirements for dealing with security problems here and now. Western intervention in the Balkan crisis revealed how little relevance much of the duel over ESDI had for what the Allies in practice were willing and able to do. Too often, preferences in choosing among EU, WEU, and NATO had more to do

with enhancing the status of preferred bodies than with performing missions."[23]

The European Union's search for its security and defence identity since Maastricht must be held primarily responsible for these elaborate exercises. An important reason for the failure to reach meaningful results was that the search does not respond to a security need, but to an internal, primarily French compulsion to carve out an independent role.

ESDI and European unification

As we saw above in this chapter, the creation of a European Defence Community was deemed to be "an essential step towards achieving a united Europe." Ever since its rejection in 1954 by the French National Assembly, the goal of the United States of Europe has receded to the background. What is left of the original ideal is at present expressed in the statement "that the European Union would be incomplete without a common defence policy." This idea is based on the traditional theory that unification among states must lead by necessity to a new state, whether federal or con-federal in nature. In the past, the traditional theory found support in the circumstance that unification often was motivated by the need to join forces for the purpose of self-defence. After the creation of NATO as the Alliance of democracies, such a need receded to the background. European integration proceeded from the internal dynamics of the choice for economic integration. Its success and attraction resulted from the new method for the peaceful organisation of common action. After the end of Europe's division and against the background of the abuse of state power during the Cold War, "Europe" as an ideal no longer stands for a new super-state but for an expanding zone of peace and cooperation. The federal idea today stands for a method of peaceful organisation for

[23] *Op.cit.*, p. 54 and 33.

a variety of functions at a variety of levels rather than for a final construction. Security and defence tasks have become divisible like economic, social or cultural tasks. They should be organised on the principle of complementarity of functions rather than competition of roles as still is the case in the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

NATO and the European Union: Partners After All?

In his excellent paper on the United States and European Defence, Stanley Sloane writes that the U.S. basically supports the development of common European foreign, security and defence policies and writes:

> "In fact, the EU initiative contains the seeds of the most important strategic shift in the Alliance since the end of the Cold War, and perhaps even since the Alliance as we know it took shape in the early 1950s. It has the potential to strengthen the Alliance if managed successfully, and the potential to destroy NATO if it is not."[24]

When the Heads of State and of Government met in Strasbourg/Kehl for NATO's sixtieth anniversary Summit, two important changes could be recorded by which the Allies might be capable of successfully managing the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. The first one, recorded in paragraph 5 of the Summit Declaration, is the return of France to full participation in NATO's integrated military structures. The second one is NATO's transformation challenge in relation to the August 2008 war in Georgia and the end of the Bush era in United States foreign policy.

As Asle Toje writes on the first change, France's return "may help ease concerns that the ESDP is competing with NATO. More substantially the move would increase the overlap between NATO and the EU." The dispatch of a substantial number of

[24] Stanley R. Sloane, *The United States and European Defence*, Chaillot Paper 39 of the Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2000.

French officers to NATO structures will facilitate complementarity. The transformation challenge NATO is facing is twofold. The 2008 war in Georgia puts self-defence squarely back on the agenda of the enlarged Alliance. The greater priority given by the new U.S. Administration to Afghanistan is likely to absorb much of NATO's political and military resources for quite some time.

> "In this situation there has been a change of heart among the supporters of NATO regarding the desirability of cooperating more effectively with the EU. Few today see ESDP as 'a dagger aimed at the heart' of the Alliance, to quote John Bolton's memorable one-liner. On the contrary, many in NATO see the EU as a catalyst for mobilising European military capabilities. Cooperation at an aggregate EU-NATO level is now generally seen as complementing rather than supplanting the Alliance. (...) This is not only a matter of coordinating capability goals, but also of working more effectively on a political level in order to improve alliance cohesion."[25]

In the wake of the war in Georgia, the sixtieth anniversary Summit Declaration clearly re-emphasised: "A strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of the Alliance and remains our most important security task." This task needs the continuing association of the United States to the security of Europe, supported by a properly managed strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union.

[25] Asle Toje, *op.cit.*, p. 20 and 17.

EPILOGUE

This volume on "Western Cooperation, Origins and History" has dealt with the American era in world politics. The American era was inaugurated with President Woodrow Wilson's decision to enter the First World War on the side of the allied and associated powers in 1917. Despite many predictions to the contrary, the American era is not yet over. It has been characterised by the creation of such international institutions as the League of Nations, the United Nations, ILO, IBRD, IMF and UNESCO. NATO, the principal subject of Part II in this volume, was considered to be the cornerstone of the Alliance of democracies since the onset of the Cold War.

As an historical treatise, it did not present hypotheses followed by analysis and conclusions. It reviewed developments in a circumscribed period – from the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914 to the celebration of NATO's Sixtieth Anniversary on 4 April 2009. My specific purpose has been to let a selection of important documents speak for themselves. No conclusions are drawn. At best this Epilogue is offering some thoughts for further reflection to the reader after having studied the collected documents on the website with my commentaries in the preceding chapters. Every historical treatise is the product of selection. I focused on international political history and hardly dealt with international economic history. America's large market and considerable technological and economic strength have been of decisive importance for its position in the world. Globalisation is a phenomenon of the American era, as is the current international economic crisis. At the time of this writing, the impact of the crisis on America's place in the world cannot be predicted. Economists, I learned, are best in predicting the past. I must leave it to more knowledgeable fellow scholars to write the economic history of Western cooperation.

On reflection, there is good cause for surprise about the *endurance of American leadership.*

It grew despite the refusal of the U.S. Senate to join the League of Nations proposed to the world by President Wilson himself. It overcame the crisis of 1956, when Britain and France went to war over the Suez Canal without consulting Washington. It survived the defeat in the disastrous Vietnam War of the nineteen sixties and the resignation of President Nixon due to the Watergate scandal. It was not affected by the 1973 Middle-East war and the oil crisis. It survived the humiliation of the Carter Administration by the Iranians in the 1979 Teheran hostage crisis. It survived the 9/11 terrorist attack on America and the disastrous war on terror of President Bush in the early twenty-first century. Throughout the sixty years of NATO, American leadership survived the series of crises besetting the Alliance at regular intervals from the beginning. American policies were resisted and vilified, but mostly endorsed after some time. Just be reminded of the early crisis over German re-armament, the rejection of the European Defence Community, the disagreements with John Foster Dulles' roll-back and China policies, President Johnson's non-proliferation policy (in addition to the Vietnam war) and France's withdrawal from NATO, the détente policies of President Nixon/Kissinger, President Carter's approach to SALT and the Neutron bomb, President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative and the 2003 crisis over the war against Iraq. During the eight years of President Bush's presidency, there was a significant growth of anti-Americanism in Europe and anti-Europeanism in the United States, both among politicians and the (normally trend-following) intellectuals. Their writings on "the other side" amounted to caricaturing, vilification and gloomy predictions. European (mainly French) authors predicted the end of the American empire. American (in particular neo-conservative) authors predicted the demographic collapse of Europe. With the advent of the new Obama Administration in Washington and the world wide economic crisis, all of this disappeared like snow for the sun.

Throughout the past ninety years of American leadership and despite theories to the contrary, there were few watersheds, breaking- or turning points in this era except for the Second World War and the peaceful end of the Cold War. Neither the 1973 crisis nor 9/11 turned out to be the watersheds announced at the time. President Bush did not end American predominance in the world, nor did Wall Street. They just ended neo-conservative republicanism and irresponsible global capitalism in America.

Whence the strength and the endurance of American world leadership? Its strength has many sources, such as location (protected by two Oceans), the scale of its economy, natural resources, a land for immigrants, its open and democratic character and the ethical and spiritual forces of a free society, regularly re-inventing and renewing itself.

On reflection*, the endurance of NATO is* even more surprising. NATO was an American creation and continued to be shaped by America in its sixty years history. Its enlargement is driven by Washington and continues despite controversies. Its strategies were written in the United States, resisted by the European Allies and approved thereafter. At least two contradictions run through its entire history. The United States wants its European Allies to bear a heavier burden of the military effort, without giving up its leadership position. The European Union members want a more equal partnership with the United States, without carrying more of the financial and military burden. In budgetary terms there is no equal partnership between the United States and the European Union. So it was in the early years and so it remains in NATO at sixty. NATO began as an Alliance to defend the territory of its member states against the threat of Soviet aggression. It survived the Soviet Union by taking up new out-of-area missions and expanding its membership far into former Soviet territory. Both new developments were driven by the United States and reluctantly supported by the European Allies.

On further reflection, NATO was most *successful in what it did not have to do*: that is to defend NATO territory against an attack by a third state or alliance. The official line is that NATO was successful according to the old Roman maxim: *si vis pacem para bellum*. In modern NATO language that is: nuclear deterrence worked. The entire organisation with its integrated military structure and its strategic concepts was set up for the purpose of deterring an attack. From our review of NATO strategy we know that nobody really knew what to do in case deterrence would fail. In final analysis we shall never know whether deterrence worked or the Soviet Union never intended to attack. All we know for certain is that the Soviet Union had its own defensive Warsaw Pact and persistently pursued a variety of policies to defeat the West. Remembering what NATO did best will be important knowledge when the enlarged Alliance is facing Russia again.

On more reflection, *NATO's record on out-of-area problems* has been problematic from the very beginning. At the time European Allies fought their terminal colonial wars, they neither asked nor received American support. Ever since the United States sought to enlist its European Allies in support of out-of-area operations or policies, there was no answer at best, and severe criticism at worst. As befits a world power, the out-of-NATO-area list of American interventions and economic sanctions is a long one, covering Central America, Africa, the Middle-East, South East Asia and East Asia. Allied support has nowhere been forthcoming. Washington did manage to enlist European support for the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and for the air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 and KFOR thereafter. It happened mainly, because the European Union had wanted and failed to end the civil wars in Yugoslavia without American intervention. Since the Strategic Concept of 1999, the Balkans are declared to be part of the Euro-Atlantic area in which NATO "plays the central part." Still there is no Allied agreement or adequate European military capability for successfully completing the Balkan missions.

When President Bush after 9/11 tried to enlist Allied support for his war on terror, the outcome was dismal failure. The formation of coalitions of the willing only concealed the unwillingness of a majority of Allies to substantially support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whatever the legal arguments advanced in favour of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and against the decision to go to war against Iraq, European Allies' support for both operations has been minimal.

On more reflection again, *NATO's record of achievement* in out-of-area operations conducted after the end of the Cold War, is not very promising and for good historical reasons!

Yugoslavia had been an artificial creation of the 1919 Peace of Versailles, masterminded by President Wilson, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Clemenceau and Italian Prime Minister Orlando. Russia did not participate in the Conference. Among their successors there is no agreement on the future of the Balkans after the collapse of Yugoslavia. On the ground one can hardly blame the populations for having little respect for the complex variety of army units, police forces, civil authorities, NGO's and others, all pursuing their own policies without much coordination and no common purpose. Unfortunately, the presence of the "international community" may temporarily have ended the fighting but has replaced it by chaos, corruption and crime.

The histories of Afghanistan and Iraq offer other good reasons why NATO's out-of-area operations are unlikely to achieve the intended results. In their present borders, the two countries are the products of British colonial rule and victims of Western and Russian interventions. In their Islamic culture, Western armies are perceived to be enemies by definition, whatever their good intentions. Britain drew the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan right through the tribal area of the Pathans. The Taliban belong to the Pathans and receive their training mostly in the madrassas (Koran schools) of Pakistan. The borders drawn by Britain for Iraq are equally troublesome. Civil war between the Shiites in the South, the Sunni's in the centre and the Kurds in the

north was to be expected after the removal of Saddam Hussein and the presence of a Western invasion army-under-strength thereafter. Trying to impose Western style democracy by force (officially now in support of the government in power) is bound to fail. David T. Jones refers to the two out-of-area operations as *Mission Creep,* "the organizational equivalent of the 'Peter Principle'."[1] It stands for the illusion that NATO can do out-of-area peace-making operations because of the fact that it has military forces capable to do defensive operations.

On ongoing reflection, *Western democracies, do not really master the art of dealing with non-democratic regimes.* In time of peace they conduct policies of appeasement or détente. Their non-democratic Allies in war or conflict are elevated to the ranks of functioning democracies. The examples are well-known. The Grand Alliance turned Stalin into benign Uncle Joe. Beginning with Stalin every new Soviet leader was declared to be a reformer. In the war between Iraq and Iran, Saddam Hussein became respectable. President Bush and former Chancellor Schröder looked in President Putin's eyes and saw a true democrat. When East-West détente broke out in the nineteen sixties, Brezhnev's Russia became a progressive example of "really existing socialism." The result of such policies was blindness to the reality of totalitarian and other non-democratic regimes. The collapse of the Soviet system by peaceful civil resistance came as a complete surprise to our NATO politicians, intellectuals and statesmen. It was only after the end of Europe's division that we began to understand the absurdities with which Western democracies had accepted to live during the Cold War.

In time of war Western democracies tend to use overwhelming force to achieve unconditional surrender of the non-democratic enemy state or regime. Total war and totalitarian regimes are responsible for, probably, the most devastating and cruel century in human history. After the end of totalitarianism in

[1] "NATO at Sixty-Time for Reassessments," E-Notes *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, March 2009.

Europe, retreat from total war requires a critical review of the approaches to war in the Alliance of democracies. The 1999 Air campaign against Serbia over Kosovo is a recent example for serious and critical reflection.

On final reflection, it is important to realise how much the Western Alliance of democracies has been an exception rather than an example in world politics – in space as well as in time. During the ninety five years of the American era, the Alliance of democracies has known internal peace since 1950 for its original member states and only a few years for some of the newer member states. Throughout the whole period its principal members have been involved almost permanently in wars, some of them protracted and impossible to win. Out-of-area wars bear some unfortunate resemblance to Europe's colonial wars in the nineteenth century when a measure of peace prevailed among the great powers on the European continent.

Western cooperation as reviewed in this volume has not been a success story, but an exceptional example of decent international relations between a small number of states within the same civilization. NATO should not be looked at as a candidate for a global security role. It has proven its worth as an Alliance in the Cold War, but still has to prove its worth as a collective defence organisation for its current 28 member states.

Western cooperation developed and grew on the ruins and in reaction to total war, ethnic cleansing, genocide and immense human suffering. It made a difference for the better in the Euro-Atlantic area but it has not made the world a better place to live in peace and freedom.