

## PROLOGUE

According to its Preamble, the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949, “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” True, the treaty established a defensive Alliance, but it was an Alliance with no clear precedent in the history of inter-state alliances.

It claimed to be based on a common heritage and civilisation and aimed at safeguarding no less, and not just the external security of the Allied states. Its creation responded to a comprehensive Soviet threat to a way of life defined as “Western civilisation.” As British Foreign Secretary Bevin suggested to Washington, the further encroachment of the Soviet tide could be stemmed only “by organizing and consolidating the ethical and spiritual forces of Western civilization.”<sup>1</sup>

## THE WEST AS A CIVILIZATION

Unlike Europe, the Western world is not a construction of the human mind based on a poorly defined geography, but the fruit of distinct civilisation, referred to as the Western civilisation. It is a cultural reality marked since the age of discovery by continuous geographic expansion from Europe to the Americas and Australia.

Its emergence can be traced back to the break-up of the Roman Empire, which resulted in the ruptures of civilisation between East and West through the Great Schism of 1054; and between North and South, when Africa and the Middle East were lost to Islam. Ever since, Western civilisation continued to move more distinctly in a Western direction. Charlemagne’s Empire was a Western Empire. It became the Holy Roman Empire with its centre in Central Europe and Germany,

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Howard, “An Unhappy Successful Marriage”, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999, p. 164.

to be challenged increasingly by the more Westward kingdoms of France and Britain. During the twentieth century its centre of gravity moved from France and Britain to the United States of America. Despite these ruptures and Westward movements, East and West share common sources in the Christian faith that came to them from Israel, in Greek philosophy, and in Roman law as codified in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* before the final rupture between East and West. The revival of classic philosophy during the Renaissance in the West owed much to Byzantine civilisation, before it was “wiped out irrevocably” in 1453, when “Constantinople was become the seat of brutal force, of ignorance, of magnificent tastelessness.”<sup>2</sup>

In the history of civilisations, Western civilisation indeed is considered to be a distinct civilisation, but its claim to be founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, is of recent origin. Charlemagne’s Empire was a Western Empire, but it was not founded on these principles. Until the American Revolution, the Western world as a distinct civilisation was made up of Europe as it developed west of the fault-line drawn since the Great Schism of 1054. This was Western Europe, marked in its evolution by the conflict between Pope and Emperor, by Renaissance and Reformation, by the idea of sovereignty and *raison d’état*, by the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions. In Western Europe, the seminal event produced by Enlightenment was the French revolution. Despite its ideas about liberty, equality and brotherhood, the French revolution did not inaugurate a “new civilisation,” founded on democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It gave rise to a far more problematic successor to the earlier European system of the balance of power: a system no longer based on competition between dynasties, but on conflicts between nation-states. During the nineteenth century, the idea of a common Western civilisation was replaced by the idea of a Europe made up of juxtaposed and competing national cultures. America was not seen as an extension of the West, but – in the thinking of the nineteenth century – as a distinct, national civilisation.

When this system collapsed in the First World War, it was President Wilson, who forwarded the American ideas on democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law as the new foundations for a post-war world order. It was President Truman who with George Marshall and Dean Acheson after the Second World War laid these foundations for

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<sup>2</sup> Steven Runciman, *Byzantine Civilisation*, Edward Arnold, London 1975, p. 299.

Western cooperation in the second half of the twentieth century. The ideas on democracy and the rule of law as developed in the Enlightenment, did indeed have a major influence on developments in nation-states like England, Denmark or the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, as they had on developments in America, but they were looked at as ideas to be implemented within nation-states and not as ideas “for export” to other nations or the international system. England’s foreign policy sought a balance of power in Europe and colonial expansion in other continents, but had no inclination to extend its rule of law to other European nations.

President Wilson’s ideas on a new, democratic world order were new and incomprehensible to most European leaders and they could not be realised in Europe until the onset of the Cold War. It was only after the combined Nazi and communist, totalitarian assault on Europe and the expansion of communist totalitarian rule to Eastern Europe thereafter that America and Western Europe began to understand their common heritage as their common, national security interests. It were the policies of Hitler-Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, that made them discover that their security had to be founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

The North Atlantic Alliance - NATO - thus was no traditional alliance in a balance of power game, nor opposed to the concept of collective security. It became the cornerstone of post-war Western cooperation, because of the joint commitment to practice Wilsonian ideas among themselves as long as they could not be practised in the world at large. It thus became the cornerstone for a Western world order, with the double mission to defend the “free world” against totalitarian repression and to enlarge this Western order to other nations, willing and able to join an Alliance of democracies.

Democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law came to be formulated as the foundations of a common Western heritage and civilisation only after the Second World War by the United States and, under its leadership, by the West European states that joined the North Atlantic Alliance. Those latter states only gradually began to accept this common heritage, faced as they were with the necessity to accept American protection against the Soviet threat, the necessity to dismantle their colonial empires and the necessity to seek reconciliation and integration among themselves. The awareness of a common Western civilisation as the foundation for Western cooperation originated from the Cold War.

Where President Wilson had failed in his quest for world order, President Truman succeeded in laying the foundations for Western cooperation. President Wilson had tried to replace the old European system of a balance of power by a new system based on democracy, collective security and self-determination. He failed, mainly for three reasons: neither France nor Britain was prepared to follow him; the U.S. Senate rejected the Versailles Peace Treaty; and Soviet Russia and Germany were excluded from the “new” order created by the Peace Treaties.

President Truman succeeded, mainly for the following reasons. France and Britain were prepared to follow. Furthermore, the totalitarian assaults on Europe, continued by Stalin after the war, were conceived by them and by the United States as an assault on the common heritage and civilisation of Europe. Moreover, the U.S. Senate recognised the American national interest in committing the United States to its defence. Also, Western Germany was (gradually) included as a partner. And finally, in the emerging Cold War era, the East-West conflict shifted the awareness of a common heritage and civilisation from the Europe of Charlemagne to the American-West European or Atlantic West.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the dissemination of cultures reflects the distribution of power and culture always follows power.<sup>3</sup> Under the impact of the Cold War, power in the West shifted from Paris or London to Washington, and culture followed. The new awareness of a common Western civilisation was based on a European reception of American ideas. American political thinking and the American political system were accepted as source and model for organising Western cooperation and West European integration. Still, Western civilisation never knew one single centre of power. The Holy Roman Empire had many centres. Neither Rome, nor Paris, nor London ever became the undisputed centres of the West, nor is Washington today. If it is true, as Huntington argues, that the dissemination of cultures reflects the distribution of power, Western civilisation has always been pluralist in character, in which cultural development reflects the interplay between several centres of power.

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<sup>3</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York 1996, p. 91.

“The West can galvanise and disrupt, but it cannot stabilise or unite,” wrote Arnold Toynbee. The well-known historian of civilisations had a deterministic and pessimistic outlook on the future of Western civilisation, much like Oswald Spengler in the beginning and Samuel Huntington at the end of the twentieth century. Whereas Huntington tended to equate “the West” with the United States, Toynbee equated the West with Western Europe, when he wrote:

“Throughout a period of more than two-and-a-half centuries (from the last and abortive assault on Vienna by the Ottoman Empire in 1683 to the end of the Second World War in 1945), the Western Powers had virtually no others to reckon with outside their own circle, and, on the material plane, the destiny of all Mankind outside that circle was therefore determined by the course of mutual relations between those Western powers. Since 1945, however, this Western monopoly of power in the world has come to an end. (...) Non-Western powers began once again to play major parts in the arena of power politics, not in a Western framework, but on their own terms; and this reversion to normality has reintroduced a cultural conflict into a political arena which, for some 250 years past, had been reserved for the domestic political quarrels between powers that were all alike native or naturalised members of the single Western modern *Kulturkreis*.”<sup>4</sup>

The Western monopoly of power may have come to an end, but the United States is today’s predominant world power and Western cooperation is expanding eastward. The enlarged West has become a dynamic source of attraction (for better or worse) to the world for two main reasons. The first reason is related to the United States’ policy towards building a partnership of democratic nations. The second one is related to the process of European integration. As UN Secretary-General, Kofi A. Annan wrote:

“In the area of Europe that now comprises the European Union - where most modern wars started - a security community has

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<sup>4</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Oxford 1972 (new and revised and abridged edition).

emerged: an association of states characterized by dependable expectations that disputes will be resolved by peaceful means.”<sup>5</sup>

The attraction of the West has been one of the unforeseen consequences of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system. Growing resentment against Western predominance and the Western way of life is more recent a consequence, fuelled no doubt by the clash between political Islam and modernity.<sup>6</sup>

## HISTORY OF WESTERN COOPERATION

The history of Western cooperation is the subject of this book. Its central theme is the effort of “realist idealists” to replace power politics between states by an alliance of democracies. I distinguish three main periods in the history of Western cooperation:

- (1) The Failures of Western Cooperation : From the U.S. entry in the First World War in 1917 to the beginning of the Cold War in 1947, with the Grand Alliance as the link with the second period;
- (2) The Making of the West: From the beginning of the Cold War to the collapse of the Order of Yalta in 1989-1991;
- (3) Democratic Enlargement and its Opponents: From the Collapse of the Soviet system through the terrorist attacks on America to the present.

Western Cooperation and European Unification clearly belonged together in the history of international relations since the early twentieth century. Many of the same problems were encountered, their evolution was similar. Both can be traced back to the end of the First World War and to the ideas U.S. President Wilson brought with him to the Versailles Peace Conference. Both were unsuccessful between 1917 and 1947, both took of thereafter on the basis of the same fundamental

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<sup>5</sup> *We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup>. Century*, Millennium Report to the General Assembly, United Nations 2000, Chapter 3.

<sup>6</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the middle east*, London 2002.

principles. Both NATO and the European Union are in the process of enlargement since the end of Europe's division in 1989.

*The First Period: The Failures of Western cooperation*

Western cooperation during the first period was marked by many failures. President Wilson's partnership of democratic nations did not materialise (Part I, Chapter 1). His central institution for a new world order, the League of Nations, failed in its mission.

The terms of the Peace Treaties prevented Germany from joining the West as a democratic nation. Beginning with the Treaty of Rapallo, Germany turned eastward and sought Soviet support for revising the new "order" established by the Peace Treaties for East and Central Europe (Part I, chapter 2). The states in East and Central Europe became the victims of German-Soviet collusion and collision, rather than partners in an alliance of democratic nations.

The United States withdrew from the League. Its policy towards Western and international cooperation was characterised by aloofness and ambivalence despite growing involvement in the League's non-political activities (Part I, chapter 3). The West shrunk to France and Britain. In their efforts to uphold the status quo, they returned to traditional power politics. They had neither the political strength nor the moral purpose required to uphold the post-war "order." When Hitler came to power in Germany and set out to destroy the order of Versailles, they responded with policies of appeasement, and war again became unavoidable.

The formation of the Grand Alliance after 22 June 1941 was a strategic necessity and a shocking event (Part I, chapter 4). It was another example of problem democratic nations had not been able to cope with adequately: How to deal with non-democratic regimes in foreign policy and international institutions? In Wilson's concept of a partnership of democratic nations, peace had to be imposed on such regimes (such as the Central powers). Roosevelt cherished the same concept, but drew two sharply opposite conclusions from it with respect to the two totalitarian regimes. Germany was to be fought until unconditional surrender and had to be occupied and re-educated thereafter. Stalin was reinvented as a suitable partner for building a new world order. On one point Wilson and Roosevelt were of the same mind. Priority had to be given to a new world organisation (the League

of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945). This new organisation could then solve the disagreements left in post-war peacemaking (the territorial problems in 1919 and the future of Poland in 1945). The Grand Alliance prevailed over the Axis powers, but at the price of the post-war Order of Yalta – a price again paid primarily by Poland and the states of Central and Eastern Europe. As Soviet armies advanced to the Elbe, the West in Europe was little more than a shaky bridgehead facing an expanding, totalitarian Soviet empire. The new United Nations would soon turn out to be incapable of performing the tasks assigned to them.

*The Second Period: The Making of the West.*

The magnitude of the new Soviet threat evoked an imaginative response in the West and in Washington in particular. What came to be known since 1947 as the policy of containment was in reality a new departure in Western international cooperation (Part I, chapter 5). It was rightly called the dynamic counter-attraction to Soviet power and communist ideology. Its three guiding principles were: economic recovery, reconciliation with Germany and a partnership of democratic nations. Within the broader framework of Western cooperation, the same three principles guided the process of European unification, initiated by the Congress of Europe in 1948. What could not be achieved with the Soviet Union in the wider framework of the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies should be promoted in a new alliance of democracies and the peaceful organisation of common action in Europe, as a realistic possibility and an attractive example. Economic recovery as a joint task provided the momentum for multilateral cooperation and integration in Western Europe. Reconciliation with Germany enabled West Germany to be included in the system of Western cooperation as an equal partner. The alliance of democracies was neither a defensive arrangement only, nor an American sphere of influence. It was meant to be an association of states, prepared to practice the purposes and principles of the United Nations among themselves as an example to be followed.

True, the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO were the cornerstones of the new alliance of democracies and will be the subject of Part II in this book. Deterrence and defence were its primary function, but in performing that function it fulfilled the two basic needs of security and



affection. The Alliance was the firm cornerstone, indeed, from which the building of Western cooperation could be made and maintained. Created in response to an imminent threat, NATO would prove to be flexible and adaptable in its evolution. Despite regular crises, its evolution has been characterised by a gradual broadening of its functions. It neither evolved into an Atlantic Community as some Americans had hoped, nor did it become an equal partnership between the United States and a united Europe. NATO ensured a lasting American commitment to the security of Europe and a lasting German commitment to Western cooperation; two necessities that explain why serious disputes over trade or policies towards the Soviet Union could always be settled peacefully within the framework of Western cooperation.

NATO's core function was to prevent war by a strategy of deterrence and forward defence (Part II, chapter 3). Forward defence required reliance on overwhelming force which could be delivered only by the United States and its nuclear weapons potential. Maintaining a credible deterrence against a Soviet attack required reliance on nuclear weapons and their continuous development and modernisation. It required planning for the use of such weapons of mass-destruction. Was it morally permissible to do so? The question has never been answered satisfactorily. War between the Soviet Union and NATO was prevented. Deterrence until 1989 did not fail and NATO survived the period of East-West conflict without the use of force. However, the world is left with huge arsenals of nuclear and other weapons and the danger of their proliferation.

### *The Third Period: Democratic Enlargement and Its Opponents.*

The collapse of the Soviet system caught the West unprepared and fully surprised.<sup>7</sup> Later in the 1990's we began to refer to the whole period from 1947-1989 as the "Cold War" era, but such had not been the case in the 1970's or 1980's. We used to refer to the period since the early 1960's (the Cuba Missile crisis) as the era of East-West détente. Western détente policy was characterised by acquiescence in and accommodation with the Soviet bloc on the assumption that East-West coexistence was a lasting if not permanent condition in international

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<sup>7</sup> See this author's *Beyond Containment and Division. Western Cooperation from a Post-Totalitarian Perspective*, Kluwer 1992; and *The Illusions of Détente*, WLP 2009.

affairs. The alliance of democracies – like the European Union – had no contingency plans or strategy to deal with a world without a Soviet “super-power.” Western policy tried to adapt to the new situation. In its initial approach – building a new architecture of interlocking institutions – the emphasis was on working for change within the existing international institutions from the Cold War era. From 1993 onwards, the U.S. took the lead in devising a new strategy of democratic enlargement (Part I, Chapter 6 and Part II, Chapter 5).

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, America was the dominant power, when on September 11, 2001 terrorists struck the United States.

## THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON AMERICA

In the early morning of 11 September 2001, four passenger aircraft took off from Boston’s Logan Airport, New York’s Newark Airport and Washington’s Dulles Airport for what seemed to be a regular scheduled long distance flight to the American West coast. Not long thereafter, hijackers killed or incapacitated the crew and took over control of the aircraft. Two of the planes were flown into New York’s World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. The fourth plane crashed in a forest in the state of Pennsylvania. There were no survivors. The two towers of the World Trade Center were fully destroyed; one wing of the Pentagon was severely damaged. Thousands perished in the flames and in the destroyed buildings. Within half an hour after the first plane hit the World Trade Center, the news of the horrible attack came on TV around the world. Millions of people thus watched when a second plane hit the second tower and both towers thereafter collapsed in a huge cloud of burning dust. America had been attacked, literally out of the blue, by an invisible enemy.

It was war on America, but war of a new kind. The attackers themselves perished in their suicidal operation, together with the innocent passengers in the aircraft and the thousands of innocent people in their selected targets. With only box-cutters and knives, they had turned civilian aircraft into flying incendiary missiles, causing massive physical destruction to two symbols of American power.

Those who had masterminded the operation and commanded the attackers did not identify themselves. They were (identified) in a

document released on 4 October 2001 by Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom:

“The attacks of the 11 September 2001 were planned and carried out by al-Qaida, an organisation whose head is Osama Bin Laden. *That organisation has the will, and the resources, to execute further attacks of similar scale. Both the United States and its close allies are targets for such attacks.* The attack could not have occurred without the alliance between the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden, which allowed Bin Laden to operate freely in Afghanistan, promoting, planning and executing terrorist activity.” (Emphasis added)

The evidence, on which this conclusion was based, is strong and convincing. It has been confirmed by video-taped declarations on behalf of Bin Laden since 8 October 2001, at least where the attacks of 11 September are concerned.

The available evidence, nevertheless, raises a major problem. The identified enemy is not a sovereign state or an established regime, but an “organisation.” It had its headquarters and training-camps in Afghanistan and maybe elsewhere, but appears to operate primarily as a network, enabling and linking a variety of extremist groups to carry out terrorist attacks. The network extends deep into the states and societies to be attacked. The enemy is not a foreign army attacking the North Atlantic area - following an initial air strike. It is a network of “sleeping” cells woven into the fabric of free societies. Their members, living in Western societies, entered - legally or illegally - before or after being recruited and trained for terrorist missions elsewhere. They go about inconspicuously as normally admitted foreigners, until instructed by an outside source to embark on their suicidal mission of terror - a mission also without an identifiable follow-up, except for vague threats to execute further attacks of similar scale. What makes gifted young people join the network and prepares them for perpetrating mass-murder in a suicidal attack is not easy to find out.

In an Address to the joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, U.S. President Bush announced the start of a “war on terror.” As the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan refused to comply with the American demands, American and British forces struck back on Sunday night, 7 October 2001. The United States and its NATO Allies were at war with

al-Qaida, international terrorism and those regimes in the world supporting them - a war of self-defence, but self-defence of a different kind in a new type of war.

The attack on America and the war on terror have changed the world. American self-confidence has been shattered. The Western way of life as a dynamic source of attraction especially since 1989, now has become a target for deliberate destruction and disruption.

The attacks on America appear to have opened a new chapter in the scourge of international terrorism. The attacks were carefully planned, large-scale, complex and religiously motivated (Islamist). In many cases they were suicidal attacks. In Europe several attempted attacks could be prevented. Nevertheless al-Qaida was behind the Madrid bombs in commuter trains on 11 March 2004 and behind the London attacks in the Underground on 7 July 2005.

## A NEW TYPE OF WAR

The attack of 11 September 2001 on America came unexpected, literally out of the blue, despite the fact that the identified enemy - al-Qaida - and its purposes were not unknown. Nor was the threat of terrorism unknown. It had been on the agenda of many international conferences and the subject of at least nine major multilateral conventions concluded since the early sixties. The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, had recently adopted two resolutions - 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) - demanding the Taliban regime to cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organisations and to turn over Osama bin Laden to appropriate authorities to be arrested and to be brought to justice.

International terrorism - as it appears today - is both a descendant of the Cold War and a new wave of terrorism in the twenty-first century. During the Cold War, outside support to terrorist and guerrilla warfare by certain governments became more widespread. Thereafter, the terrorist network could grow and expand as a result of the break-down of political control over rogue regimes and in failed states.

*International Terrorism: a descendant of the cold war*

“At present, the rise of netwar extends from the fact that the world system is in a turbulent, susceptible transition from the modern era, whose climax was reached at the end of the cold war, to a new era that is yet to be aptly named.”<sup>8</sup>

The “modern era” of international terrorism probably began in the nineteen sixties. The internationalisation of terrorism had three primary causes: the vulnerability of modern civil aviation to sabotage and hijacking in flight; open and hidden international support for terrorist attacks of a variety of Palestinian groups against Israel, seen by many regimes in the communist and third world as legitimate in the pursuit of Palestinian self-determination; and the decision of the Soviet leadership (presumably taken in 1966) to support national and international terrorist groups. The vulnerability of civil aviation and open (in particular Western) societies in general, offered evil planners attractive new targets for destruction and disruption. The emotionally and religiously charged Palestinian-Israeli conflict was (and is) a seed-bed for violence and fanaticism. For the Soviet leadership support for terrorism was an attractive and inexpensive instrument for undermining its principal adversary, the Atlantic Alliance; through covert assistance to groups operating in Allied states or in areas of strategic importance to the West.

Soviet support - directly or by proxy - took many forms, such as:

- Provisions for the training of terrorists (“freedom fighters”) in training camps known to have existed in

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<sup>8</sup> The authors gave the following definition of netwar: “the term netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a central command.” See: David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, *Networks, Netwars .The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, RAND 2001.

- the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South Yemen, Libya and North-Korea;
- Provisions of arms, directly or from pre-positioned stocks (e.g. in Libya, Fatah-land in South Lebanon and Cuba) to a variety of terrorist groups;
  - Financial support (e.g. to the German Red Army Faction);
  - Intelligence support, in particular through the East-German STASI;
  - Providing safe hiding places to terrorists; and
  - Facilities for coordination and communication by KGB officers operating from Soviet embassies and agencies or through the PLO which had an office in Moscow since 1974.

The measure of coordination and logistical sophistication displayed by terrorists since the modern era of terrorism could not have been possible without such outside help. Soviet support for terrorism came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet system and the Soviet Union itself in 1989-1991. The network did not disappear, nor did state-support for international terrorism.

#### *State-Support for International Terrorism*

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had been among the states supporting terrorism. State support by some former Soviet allies and other governments did not come to an end after the Cold War. In the report “*Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*” of the U.S. Department of State, seven governments – in addition to Afghanistan – are designated as state sponsors of international terrorism<sup>9</sup> and two more are mentioned as states of concern.<sup>10</sup> In the latest “*Country Report on Terrorism*” of April 2008, Iraq and Libya are no longer on the list.

Assessing the nature of state support for international terrorism, five types of involvement could be distinguished:

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<sup>9</sup> Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and Sudan. Five of them are former Soviet allies.

<sup>10</sup> Pakistan and Lebanon.

1. Some states provide international assistance to terrorist movements within other states. Basque ETA terrorists, for example, gained sanctuary in Cuba, and Colombia's two largest terrorist organisations maintained a permanent presence on the island.

2. Other states, like Syria and Iraq before March 2003, offered safe havens or operational bases for national terrorist organisations, which also attack international targets; such as Palestinian groups like the Abu Nidal Organisation or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PLFP-GC).

3. Some states maintain a highly ambivalent and tolerant attitude towards international terrorism. In their official policies, their governments support international measures against terrorism. At the same time terrorist groups received hidden financial support (Saudi-Arabia), training and other facilities (Pakistan) or operate from areas beyond effective control (Pakistan).

Until recently, "Saudi Arabia was one of the two critical sponsors of the Taliban movement, along with Pakistan. Saudi money, religious teachings and diplomats helped the Taliban secure and keep control of Afghanistan. (...) Saudi Arabia has also sponsored the fundamentalist academies known as madrassas in Pakistan. (...) The Saudi government has allowed Saudi-based charitable organizations to funnel money to al-Qaida and its terrorist network. (...) Since September 11, Riyadh has refused pleas from Washington to freeze bin Laden's assets and those of his associates."<sup>11</sup> Despite official denials, support for Sunni-terrorism continues, including support to Sunni groups in Iraq.

4. Two governments are known to have themselves organised international terrorist operations.

Libya has been accused of organising the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 (with doubtful evidence).

Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini created since 1979 his network of "Holy Terror" as part of "his campaign to spread his revolutionary version of

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<sup>11</sup> The Report of the U.S. Department of State on Patterns of Global Terrorism does not even mention Saudi Arabia among state sponsors of international terrorism, nor does the 2008 report. *International Herald Tribune/The New York Times Editorial*, Monday October 15, 2001.

fundamentalist Islam to the entire globe.” According to the Report of the U.S. Department of State, Iran’s campaign is directed primarily against “Zionism until Israel is completely eradicated” through Hezbollah and support to Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad and PLFP-GC. With his campaign, however, Khomeini created the new phenomenon of Islamic terrorism, which differs from all other forms of terrorism in at least three important respects:

*First*, “it considers itself as an expression of Islamic revival – which must, by definition, lead to the conquest of the entire globe by the True Faith – it bases all its actions on the dictum that the end justifies the means,” recourse to terrorism among them.

*Second*, it is “conceived and conducted as a form of Holy War which can only end when total victory has been achieved.” It does not seek negotiations or concessions, not even “a negotiated surrender, but the enemy’s total annihilation.”

*Third*, it “forms the basis of a whole theory both of individual conduct and of state policy.”

“What the fundamentalists are now trying to do is to ignore Islam’s experience during the fourteen centuries of its existence, and to reduce it once again to the embryonic form it had in Medina when Muhammad ruled. The fundamentalists, terrorized by their vision of the contemporary world, seek safety and protection in a past that did not exist as they imagine it today. Fear of life makes them worship death.”<sup>12</sup>

Khomeini’s (shi-ite) version of Islam did not represent Islamic teaching as understood by the majority of the faithful, their Muslim clerics or Muslim scholars. Still, it did have substantial impact on the Islamic states and the Muslim populations around the world.<sup>13</sup> Its Lebanese Hezbollah also led the way in the globalization of international terrorism.

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<sup>12</sup> Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror. The inside story of Islamic terrorism*, London 1987, pp. 6-10.

<sup>13</sup> The dress-code for Muslim women, as an example, changed everywhere since 1979. Fear for Western-style emancipation of women is one of the keys to understanding the problem of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamism is largely a reaction to the image of the woman offered by Western civilisation. See, Yves Lacoste in an interview published by *Famille chretienne*, Hebdomadair Familial Catholique, Numero 1239, 2001.



5. The fifth type of involvement is a failed-state type of government, unable to control or prohibit terrorist operations in or from their territory. The Taliban regime of Afghanistan and al-Qaida (before October 2001) chose to be partners, both in ruling most of the country and in promoting international terrorism. In Iraq after the U.S. invasion, the new government has been incapable to control terrorist violence within the country. In Pakistan various governments have been unable to control the tribal areas from where the Taliban are mounting attacks on Afghanistan.

*International terrorism: the new network*

Osama bin Laden - the primary suspect in the attack on America - went to Afghanistan in 1979 to help the *mujahedeen* in their fight against the Soviet invasion. Bin Laden became the chief financier in an organisation established by his Palestinian teacher Abdullah Azzam to assist the *mujahedeen* and recruit Arab fighters - the "Arab Afghans." The organisation is said to have received substantial financial support from the CIA. Al-Qaida grew out from this organisation in 1989, the year the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, and bin Laden returned to Saudi-Arabia, using his network to raise funds for the veterans of the Afghan war. In 1989 also, the United States - patron of the Afghan rebellion - walked away, leaving the Afghans, until then in the frontline of the cold war, to their own devices to fight out a cruel civil war in a devastated country. Al-Qaida itself began as a direct descendant of the Cold War.

In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. In response, the Saudi government allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in Saudi-Arabia. Outraged by the U.S. military presence in Saudi-Arabia, considered to be the cradle of Islam, Osama bin Laden turned against his own government. In 1991 he was expelled from Saudi-Arabia and took refuge in Sudan. Under strong American and Saudi pressure he was expelled from Sudan in 1996. He moved with his family to Afghanistan and declared holy war against U.S. forces.

On 23 February 1998, Al-Quds al-Arabi, an Arabic newspaper published in London, printed the full text of a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders." The

faxed declaration bore the signatures of Osama bin Laden and the leaders of militant Islamist groups in Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The American occupation of Arabia, the war against Iraq and American support for “the petty state of the Jews,” according to the Declaration are crimes amounting to a “clear declaration of war by the Americans against God, his Prophet, and the Muslims.” When enemies attack Muslim lands, “jihad becomes every Muslim’s personal duty.”

After quoting various Muslim authorities, the signatories then proceed to the final and most important part of their declaration, the fatwa, or ruling. It holds that:

“To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until the Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Haram Mosque [in Mecca] are freed from their grip and until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, incapable of threatening any Muslim.”

After citing some further relevant Quranic verses, the document continues:

“By God’s leave, we call on every Muslim who believes in God and hopes for reward to obey God’s command to kill the Americans and plunder their possessions wherever he finds them and whenever he can. Likewise we call on the Muslim ulema and leaders and youth and soldiers to launch attacks against the armies of the American devils and against those who are allied with them from among the helpers of Satan.”<sup>14</sup>

In the post-1989 transitional era, a new network of (mainly Sunni) Islamic terrorism has been created in addition to the Shi-ite network created by Iran since 1979. The new network of international terrorism is directed, not by a state, but by a “non-governmental organisation,” al-Qaida, through which individuals from more than 60 countries are recruited, taken to Afghanistan for training and sent to “hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction,” as President Bush said in his 20 September Address.

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<sup>14</sup> Quoted from: Bernard Lewis, “License to Kill”, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1998).

Al-Qaida's terrorism, however, no longer is a new phenomenon. It is Islamic terrorism like Khomeini's terrorism. It concurs with the latter in all three respects as is clear from a comparison of Khomeini's version with the Declaration of 1998. Neither the one nor the other can be dismissed as no more than fringe forms of Islamic extremism. Neither the one nor the other are seen by other Muslims as apostates and both enjoy wide popularity.

Nevertheless, differences must be mentioned. Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism has the advantages of territorial sovereignty in supporting terrorist operations. Al-Qaida has been able to go global by its ability as an NGO to move more freely in a globalizing international society, but bin Laden - not yet caught by the Americans - must coordinate from hiding places.

World-wide terrorist operations have been facilitated by the increase in international travel, the easing of border controls, the international flows of money, the growth of mass media and advances in communications and information technology - such as Internet and satellite phones. As Paul R. Pillar writes:

“The greater mobility of terrorists and the proliferation of terrorist cells have blurred organizational lines. International terrorism has become the work less of distinct and well-defined groups than of networks (of individuals and of ill-defined and constantly shifting groups). Cells often contain members of more than one nationality, with affiliations to more than one group, and groups cooperate in procuring false documents and moving operatives. The blurring of organizational lines has made it increasingly difficult to determine responsibility for terrorist acts. The networks make it plausible to describe much that goes on in the terrorist world as ‘linked to’ this or that group or leader (such as Osama bin Laden), but linkage does not necessarily mean operational control.”<sup>15</sup>

The post-1989 transitional era has also given terrorists easy access to the means and weapons for carrying out attacks. Internet grew out of the American global electronic network, originally devised by the Pentagon for confidential communication. The breakdown of controls in the former Soviet empire and in states now characterised as “failed states,”

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<sup>15</sup> “Terrorism Goes Global. Extremist groups extend their reach worldwide,” *Brookings Review*, Fall 2001, Vol. 19, No. 4.

has resulted in a virtually uncontrollable arms-trade of all types - including missiles, biological agents and chemical weapons and, probably, components of nuclear weapons. Regimes like those of Iran capable of developing weapons of mass-destruction and known to support Islamic terrorism, add to the danger of terrorist use of such weapons.

The magnitude of the attack on America has made the world and the West aware of a qualitatively different and new type of international terrorism. International terrorists can no longer be conceived only as criminals to be brought to justice. They are adversaries engaged in acts of war against - primarily so far - the United States of America. In one single morning, the United States lost its invulnerability to a foreign attack - an invulnerability that had been the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Alliance and American power.

The new adversary is an elusive enemy. He has no territory to defend. Even when the partnership between al-Qaida and the Taliban can be destroyed and bin Laden captured, the network could survive and launch new attacks. As the United States now knows and Israel knew for a long time, there hardly is a good defence against suicide attacks.

Unlike aggressor-states, which attack to conquer territory and seek domination, Islamic terrorists have no war-aims beyond destruction and disruption and threats of further such attacks. The attack of 11 September on America was a rare event, not a first strike in a strategy for sustained warfare as was the case with "Pearl-Harbor." The terrorist mind set is not like the mind set of planners of wars of conquest. Their mind set:

"is, in a sense, so tribal, medieval, and absolutist that it represents an effort to challenge the 21<sup>st</sup> Century with 13<sup>th</sup> Century (or earlier) ideals - as well as to ruin Americans' hopes for the future. Thus we should not think of bin Laden as being clinically 'insane' but rather as culturally and temporally perverse."<sup>16</sup>

The religious justification given to the attacks on America is a perversion of Islam. Their nostalgia to an imaginary past makes no sense as a war-aim against the modern West. To see the world as divided between two camps - the faithful Muslim who is always right

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<sup>16</sup> David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, *op.cit.*

and the infidels (all the others) who are always wrong - is a mockery of the real world. To thank God for the attacks on America is a perversion of religion itself and an affront to believers of any faith. Death and destruction perpetrated by “young people who look forward to death” in suicide missions does not lead to victory for the “True Faith” but unavoidably to self-destruction for the planners and organisers as much as for those young people they sent on their lethal missions.

The terrorist attacks on America confront the Western Alliance with a new type of war and not just with another variety or kind of war for the prevention of which the North Atlantic Alliance was formed in 1949. Until 11 September 2001, acts of terrorism were looked at primarily as criminal acts for which the perpetrators had to be brought to justice. In a few cases in which state-involvement in specific acts was deemed to be evident, the United States responded with a retaliatory strike justified as a strike in self-defence. The new adversary of 11 September 2001 is an elusive enemy, who is at the same time nowhere - with no territory of its own - and everywhere - in cells inside allied territory. His attack was not the beginning of a sustained military campaign against the North Atlantic area. The “war-aims” of the terrorist enemy were (and are) unclear. By virtue of their Declaration, al-Qaida terrorists performed their self-declared duty to kill as many Americans and their allies, civil and military, as possible and to fill America with fear, but for no identifiable purpose. The declared duty to kill all infidels and begin with the Americans can only end in self-destruction. The distant past to which they want to return never existed. How can an alliance of democracies defend itself against such perversion and self-destruction?

### *The War on Terror*

The war on terror declared by former President Bush in response to the 9/11 attack, has not been won at the end of his two terms in office. His war has not answered the question raised at the end of the previous paragraph. In fact, the war has seriously weakened the alliance of democracies in several respects.

Operation Enduring Freedom launched on 7 October 2001 by the United States and Coalition forces was presented as a self-defence mission and as such was the first military operation in the war on terror. After the removal of the Taliban in December 2001, the United

Nations Security Council authorized the establishment ISAF (the International Security Assistance Force). No victory in this part of the war is in sight (see further Part II, Chapter 3).

The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to depose Saddam Hussein was presented as another operation in the war on terror by the Bush Administration. The decision, taken without authorization by the UN Security Council, deeply divided the Alliance and the American people. As it turned out, no connections could be identified between Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaida network, nor could any weapons of Mass Destruction as yet be found. The quick military victory in fact was a catastrophic defeat. Iraq descended in sectarian violence and cruel civil war, opening the country to the very terrorists the war on terror was meant to defeat. The Iraq war undermined the Alliance, severely affected America's leadership and contributed to the serious international financial crisis in 2008 (see further Part I, Chapter 6 and Part II, Chapter 3).

Despite impressive and troublesome national safety measures, the alliance of democracies has so far failed to address the Islamist challenge in terms of safeguarding the Western common heritage and civilization. "War on terror" may have been the wrong response to this challenge, but another more adequate response is still to be found.

## THE WEST AND THE WORLD

The evolution of the West determined the development of international relations since the First World War. Part I in this volume covers the ninety-five years from the First World War to the present; Part II covers the sixty years of the Alliance of Democracies. The footprints of the West and the United States of America are everywhere. Modern international law was made in Europe and reformed in America. International Relations as a discipline was an American invention. They tiptoe through modern history and sometimes leave light footprints. Democracy has deep roots in Greek philosophy, the Christian faith and Western civilization; when we follow its footsteps, we become aware how fragile democratic government actually is. In international relations democracies tend to opt for appeasement when moral strength is called for. In war they employ overwhelming force to reach the unconditional surrender of the enemy, where more limited means and war aims would have been better. The

first atomic bomb was thrown by an American pilot to achieve Japan's unconditional surrender and NATO's strategy still maintains the option of using nuclear weapons in case of war. Stronger footprints are leading us in other directions, some of them promising, many troublesome. They lead us from the victory of the democracies in the First World War to the rise of totalitarian regimes in Russia, Italy and Germany. Western ideas had consequences. When we follow the footprints of some Western philosophies in the nineteenth century, we end up in Auschwitz and the Gulag through the moral confusion caused by the First World War. The spectacle of the ruins of total war and totalitarian repression caused some statesmen to change course. Their footprints bring us to reconciliation with Germany after the Second World War, to international and European human rights treaties, to Marshall Aid and European unity. The utter absurdity of the communist project in East and Central European countries caused their citizens to revolt peacefully. Their footprints lead us to *Solidarnosc*, Charta 77 and the peaceful collapse of the Soviet system. The impact of this collapse and of the end of Europe's division reaches far beyond Europe and the West.

Technology and economic growth are responsible for unprecedented increases in wealth and comfort for many, but also for sharper contrasts between the rich and the poor. The more troublesome footsteps they leave are the shallow belief in material progress as human progress. With that belief everything behind us is obsolescent, old fashioned or bad and should be forgotten. As a consequence our era has become one of organised forgetting, widespread ignorance and collective disowning of our past.<sup>17</sup>

This volume is another product of my firm conviction that history must be taught and must be learned at our schools and universities. The ideology of organised forgetting is the worst disservice the West can offer the world. Studying history means learning from the past. Learning from history may help against repeating the same mistakes. Above all it should instil our minds with the awareness of our human weaknesses. Western cooperation is no success story, but worth learning from.

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<sup>17</sup> Also: Tony Judt, *Reappraisals.reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*, Penguin Press 2008.